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This thesis explores the practices of six state or local law enforcement agencies in 
the field of maritime homeland security. Using the Delphi Survey Method on a sample of 
the highest-risk, most strategically located, and most commercially important ports in the 
United States, this thesis looks at the successes and challenges of grant funding, training 
practices, recovery efforts, and state government role in maritime homeland security.  
The resounding and underlying theme of the best practices cited by these port 
areas is centered on collaborative efforts across federal, state, local, and tribal agencies. 
Respondent agencies noted that the most successful practices in their respective 
ports were the result of coordination across information sharing, exercises and drills, 
task forces, and centers (fusion centers, operations centers, coordination centers, 
and training centers). 
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The roles and practices of state and local law enforcement in maritime homeland 
security are important to the discussion of security in the nation’s ports. With so many 
federal agencies, programs, funding streams and other efforts directed at securing ports, 
efforts driven at the state and local level might be overlooked. The 361 ports of the 
United States have some interplay between federal, state, and local agencies, as well as 
varied and diverse types of operations traveling through the ports.  
A study of the practices of the state and local agencies within these ports should 
consider both the agencies involved and the types of activity supported in these ports. Not 
only should the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) risk matrix be considered, but 
also the importance of these ports to the military and national security, and their 
respective roles in the commerce of the nation. The ports selected for study in this 
research were identified because of their convergence or overlap in more than one of 
these areas: Department of Homeland Security Group I ports, Department of Defense 
(DOD) strategic ports, and United States Maritime Administration top ten commercial 
ports. This methodology was used to identify the six port areas of Seattle/Tacoma, Los 
Angeles/Long Beach, Houston/Galveston, New Orleans, Virginia, and Delaware Bay/
Philadelphia selected for this survey. 
The actions taken by state and local law enforcement in the complex network of 
ports have the potential to impact larger homeland security practices across the United 
States. This research reveals that state and local law enforcement agencies operating 
within the maritime domain have adapted their traditional law enforcement and crime 
prevention postures to find creative practices to secure the maritime domain. 
The goal of this research, data collection, and analysis was to determine how state 
and local agencies have chosen to fill the void between their state and local law 
enforcement practices and the requirements of federal regulations. More importantly, it 
was the author’s hope to reveal the important, smart, or best practices that these state and 
local agencies have implemented to develop maritime homeland security within the ports. 
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What has emerged from this bridging of the gap is a new system of maritime 
homeland security for state and local law enforcement. Recognizing the importance of 
this new mission, this research revealed that a majority of the responding agencies had 
shifted their priorities from tactics that focused on law enforcement and crime prevention, 
to a new system of policing that addressed the larger priorities of port security. Following 
the development of this new system, these state and local law enforcement agencies have 
developed new capabilities to address threats within the maritime domain, these agencies 
have been inserted into new avenues of information sharing; they have deployed new 
equipment and discovered the need to enhance the training for their personnel.  
With 361 ports nationwide, an effective process by which to identify a small 
number of state and local agencies was critical. The author looked at three important 
characteristics of the ports surveyed: the port’s importance in terms of the risk it faces 
relative to other ports, the port’s importance to commerce in the United States, and the 
port’s importance to national security. Each of the ports surveyed in this research were 
ranked as important in at least one of these categories. Ports high in the risk evaluative 
criteria were determined to be so using the DHS’s risk matrix. Ports important to 
commerce were determined to be so using the United States Maritime Administration’s 
top ten list of commercial ports (ports highest in volume or value of goods imported). 
Ports important to national security were determined to be so using the DOD’s network 
of 22 strategic ports (17 commercial and five military operated ports). 
Six agencies within 361 is a relatively small sample size; even within their own 
ports, these six agencies were only six of 17 agencies that had maritime homeland 
security responsibilities within their ports. However, when six agencies from across the 
United States can be surveyed and a clear consensus of successful or effective practices 
can be conveyed, these practices may speak to best practices or better opportunities for 
other ports to follow. Additionally, where these six agencies found opportunities to work 
with other federal, state and local agencies toward a common goal and not carry the 
burden of maritime homeland security independently, it provides efficiency opportunities 
for agencies facing budget or staffing challenges.  
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The main claim of this study is that state and local law enforcement agencies have 
engaged not only in satisfying federal port security priorities, but also in implementing 
new and innovative practices that enhance homeland security. Survey responses revealed 
three themes related to the successes state and local agencies have experienced in the 
field of maritime homeland security.  
First, ties were strong across the agencies to examples of partnering with other 
agencies. Each agency listed examples of training, exercises, and operations with which 
their agencies were able to partner with federal, state and local agencies to solve a 
problem in the field of maritime homeland security. These opportunities to partner 
included heightening a security posture in response to a maritime security threat, or 
working together to plan for and secure a special event within the port, or to test 
preparedness through simulations, drills, and exercises. 
Second, respondent agencies identified the value of grant funding for their 
agencies to accomplish their maritime homeland security responsibilities. Surveyed 
respondents reported overwhelmingly that the influx of grant funding had provided a 
mechanism both for enhancing security measures to satisfy federal requirements, and a 
much needed funding stream to maintain new capabilities on an on-going basis. 
The third example, training, provided by the respondent agencies was cited as 
both a success and an opportunity to continue to improve port and maritime security. 
Maritime homeland security agencies believed that the training they have provided within 
their own agencies, or training they have participated in within their region, has been 
extremely valuable to advancing their homeland security missions. These same agencies 
also believed the state or federal government have a role in providing standardized 
training, specific to maritime homeland security. These agencies had adapted to this 
challenge, but several of the agencies believed standardized training could assist with 
filling this gap. 
In addition to successes, challenges also arose in maritime homeland security. 
Finance-focused concerns were prevalent when agencies discussed challenges they had 
already faced and what they saw of concern on the horizon. Specifically, agencies 
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identified budget cuts or constraints that had led to the reduction of staff. What further 
complicated this staff reduction was the acknowledgment that the mission of these 
agencies had greatly increased in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Concerns were 
raised about sustaining this enhanced mission and continuing to “do more with less.” 
Since these maritime homeland security agencies have been heavily dependent on federal 
and state grants to fulfill their homeland security mission, these agencies expressed 
concern about the reduction in grant funding and the inflexibility of these grant funds to 
provide funding for what was needed most (personnel costs). 
Recovery was another area of challenge for the agencies surveyed. With strong 
ties to the finance and commercial aspects of ports, recovery and the “return to normal” 
in the aftermath of a human generated or natural disaster events was the most difficult 
phase of the homeland security cycle for these ports to address. In the event that 
technology linked security measures failed as part of an incident impacting maritime 
homeland security, the recovery phase of the cycle was believed to be very labor 
intensive and demanding for these law enforcement agencies. Due to their existing 
internal budget and external grant concerns, recovery from homeland security incidents 
was believed to be a serious challenge for these agencies. 
One agency surveyed was able to provide a detailed plan developed within its port 
region, to prepare for the recovery from a port-centered incident. This agency began with 
the inclusion of the recovery phase in its drills and exercises, a practice often skipped by 
other agencies. Additionally, this agency discussed plans within its own agency, as well 
as with its regional partners to shift security related personnel and equipment to speed the 
“return to normal” within its port. Due to the commerce flowing through U.S. ports, the 
return to normal or recovery from a maritime homeland security incident is a critical 
component for law enforcement and maritime homeland security agencies to plan for and 
address.  
Many of the best practices highlighted by the surveyed agencies involved the 
practice of collaboratively working with other agencies in the maritime domain. Whether 
this collaboration was a build up to support planned exercises and special events, or the 
practice of routine, daily operations in special units, task forces, and operations centers, 
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the state and local agencies surveyed all recognized the value of working together to 
support maritime homeland security. Indeed, each agency readily recognized the size and 
scope of their responsibilities and the great demands a homeland security incident would 
place upon them. In support of these collaborative engagements, state and local agencies 
reported “layers” of joint agency cooperative efforts. These joint interactions extended 
from the command level of the agencies involved to the line, operational level of 
personnel in the field. To support these joint efforts, developing and maintaining a robust 
training program is greatly needed.  
Standardized state-level training for police officers is the common framework for 
the state and local police and security agencies patrolling the maritime domain. This 
training model, usually implemented in the police academy environment, not only 
provides the basic training for state and local agencies in the maritime domain, but it may 
also provide an opportunity to provide maritime specific standardized training to bridge 
the gap between federal regulations and the maritime homeland security practices of state 
and local law enforcement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
America’s system of ports is widespread, diverse, and comprised of components 
of commerce, recreation, national defense, and tourism. To understand the maritime 
homeland security efforts put into place after 9/11 better, a study of the practices 
employed taken by state and local law enforcement to secure these ports is important. 
This study provides a small perspective of a much broader effort to ensure the flow of 
commerce and defense necessary resources through the maritime borders. It is critical to 
the security of these ports that state and local law enforcement learn more about the 
practices that have enhanced security, and also to recognize where opportunities exist to 
make improvements in the system of maritime homeland security.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What maritime homeland security practices have been implemented by state and 
local law enforcement that could be leveraged nationally to enhance federal port security 
priorities? 
B. PROBLEM SPACE 
With 361 ports in the United States, 90% of the commerce of this country 
traveling through these ports, generating more than $2 trillion to the economy, securing 
the maritime domain is essential to homeland security efforts and the secure movement of 
military equipment and people.1 While the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is 
designated by federal statute2 as having overall responsibility for events that occur in the 
maritime environment, often state and local law enforcement provide the initial response 
to maritime security related incidents. Federal agencies, such as the USCG3 and the 
                                                 
1 Maritime Administration, America’s Ports and Intermodal Transportation System (Washington, DC: 
United States Department of Transportation, 2009), 21. 
2 “ECFR—Code of Federal Regulations,” December 27, 1994, http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?SID=85489166456dde0aa934a9a134702d0b&mc=true&node=se33.1.1_101_630&rgn=div8.  
3 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (2002) at 7. 
 2 
Customs Service4 (now Customs and Border Protection), under the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and identified in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
2002 (MTSA), have also adopted instituted regulations, plans and strategies for incidents 
occurring within the maritime environment. Some of these regulations, plans, and 
strategies are explored in the literature review portion of this research.  
Often, the initial response to violations of these regulations and incidents that may 
threaten maritime homeland security is initiated by state or local law enforcement 
agencies. As indicated by the state and local agencies surveyed for this research, 75% of 
the agencies in each port with primary responsibility for responding to maritime 
homeland security incidents were state or local law enforcement agencies. This research 
demonstrates that in the aftermath of 9/11, state and local agencies shifted their priorities 
from standard crime prevention and law enforcement duties to focus on securing the 
maritime homeland security environment. This research studies the practices these state 
and local agencies have implemented to satisfy federal regulations, and more importantly, 
to “fill the gap” and to secure the “maritime domain.” The concept of the maritime 
domain was first addressed in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-41/
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-13, signed by President George W. 
Bush. This directive defines the maritime domain as, “All areas and things, on, under, 
relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean or other navigable waterway, 
including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and 
other conveyances.”5 With this broad spectrum of areas in the maritime domain, the 
efforts to secure it involve numerous agencies, diverse methods, and coordination 
between public and private agencies. The actions taken by state and local law 
enforcement in the complex network of ports have the potential to impact larger 
homeland security practices across the United States. Figure 1 depicts the focus of this 
research on the post-9/11 practice changes implemented to bridge the gap between pre-9/
                                                 
4 Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (2002) at 27. 
5 White House, National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41, Maritime Security Policy, 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-13 (Washington, DC: White House, 2004), 2. 
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11 practices and federal regulations, plans, and strategies to enhance maritime homeland 
security. 
Figure 1.  Federal Influence on State and Local Law Enforcement Practices 
 
 
A study of the changes in state and local law enforcement agencies’ practices is 
important because it was anticipated to reveal best or smart practices that can be 
leveraged nationwide. The federal regulations put into place to guide efforts to secure the 
maritime domain in principle apply across America’s system of 361 ports. Therefore, 
practices implemented in one port could be adopted by another. Conversely, this study of 
state and local law enforcement practices in the maritime domain is important because it 
may serve to identify unaddressed gaps in individual ports and their approach to securing 
the maritime domain. 
Embarking on the journey to identify maritime homeland security practices 
implemented by state and local law enforcement begins with a look at what ports to study 
within the United States. With a system of 361 ports, is it fair to ask which ports would 
be selected for the study of these practices? What criteria exist to identify the most 
important ports across the United States? Who decides their importance, and upon what is 
this determination based? 
For the purposes of this research, the author selected ports that were important 
because of their risk (as determined by the DHS), because of their importance to 
commerce (as determined by the United States Maritime Administration), and those with 
importance to national security (as determined by the DOD). The complete explanation 
of this methodology is explained in Chapter IV.  











Considering the risk of ports, their importance to the economy and national 
security, the investment of Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) funds to secure the U.S.’ 
ports, and the areas and agencies involved in this maritime domain, studying and 
identifying the roles of state and local law enforcement agencies in the maritime domain 
is vital to understanding the effectiveness of maritime homeland security. Such research 
and study could identify smart practices of these agencies, as well as gaps in maritime 
homeland security. With so many U.S. ports, a gap exists in understanding the extent to 
which any best practices in ports are being leveraged nationally and how these practices 
have reduced the risk faced by these ports. The federal PSGP provides a risk-centric view 
of priorities for maintaining port security within the United States. Studying the practices 
of individual ports may provide insight about how the specific practices of state and local 
agencies have been implemented to address these federal security priorities. Since these 
agencies are state and local, it may be necessary for state and local needs to satisfy 
federal priorities that should be considered at a national level. With nearly 15 years since 
the events of 9/11 and the changes in federal regulations implemented since then, it is 
important to ask what else should be done. In the literature review of this research, the 
author explores some of the regulations, plans, and strategies that have been implemented 
to secure the maritime domain.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Law enforcement agencies from the federal, state, and local levels all have roles 
in maritime domain security. Federal agencies have authorities and responsibilities 
identified by statute to enforce federal maritime laws and investigate federal crimes 
occurring in the maritime domain. Local agencies provide an initial response and are 
responsible in many cases for patrolling the maritime domain. The central premise of this 
thesis is that local law enforcement agencies are the most available, and therefore, should 
be the most responsible for addressing threats in the maritime homeland security domain. 
While federal agencies maintain overall responsibility for homeland security threats in 
the maritime domain, these agencies do not maintain a full-time presence in the maritime 
domain. Local law enforcement, due to its patrol presence for service calls of all types in 
 5 
the maritime domain, is uniquely poised to provide an initial response to maritime 
homeland security events. 
The problem confronted by state and local law enforcement in maritime homeland 
security is the lack of efforts made to study their agencies’ roles in maritime homeland 
security to reveal best practices and potential avenues for innovation. This problem is 
important for two primary reasons. 
First, the actions of state and local law enforcement in a tightly coupled, complex 
environment can potentially have cascading effects across this nationwide, intermodal 
network. As previously described, ports are critical to the national economy and the 
national defense. This closure or restricting of port activity was evident in the aftermath 
of 9/11. In ports like San Diego, local law enforcement worked in tandem with the USCG 
at heightened security to stop and board vessels entering the port. In addition to being 
very demanding for law enforcement personnel, these boardings restrict and slow all 
types of vessel traffic entering ports. Inaction by law enforcement that might allow a 
successful terrorist attack could result in port closures and global trade impacts as well. 
Providing a study of best or smart practices for state and local law enforcement may 
contribute to the mitigation of port security related events that could also potentially 
impact the nation and global trade.  
Second, evidence states that ports separated geographically see similar trends in 
criminal or homeland security incidents. These trends have been observed in the “panga” 
vessels smuggling from Mexico north into the United States. What was initially observed 
in the Port of San Diego (the most southwest U.S. port) has now been seen in adjacent 
counties and as far north as Monterey, CA.6 If true in the smuggling environment, other 
areas may experience similar trends as well. Providing state and local law enforcement 
with common awareness and tools to counter threats to maritime homeland security could 
start with better understanding of what practices are employed by port security agencies.  
                                                 
6 Cynthia Lambert, “Panga Boats Running Drugs from Mexico Are Pushing North, Landing on SLO 
County Beaches,” The Tribune, December 1, 2012, http://www.sanluisobispo.com/2012/12/01/2313653/ 
panga-boats-running-drugs-from.html.  
 6 
The federal mandates related to port security have been integrated in addition to 
existing traditional law enforcement responsibilities that existed before 9/11 (patrol, 
crime prevention, and others). A study of the system that has emerged as a result of 
incorporating these additional duties could provide valuable information to be shared 
across ports, and state and local law enforcement agencies. 
For local law enforcement to secure the maritime domain effectively, a better 
understanding of local law enforcement’s current capabilities is required. Local law 
enforcement is involved in the prevention, protection, initial response, and mitigation of 
attacks in the maritime domain. As observed in Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s 
Guide, local law enforcement is uniquely positioned to provide an initial response to 
terrorism-related incidents.7 Additionally, this guide highlights the role of local law 
enforcement in understanding the threat environment they patrol. This guide has served 
as a resource for law enforcement agencies in employing community-oriented policing 
strategies to counter the threat of terrorism in the United States. While some may see this 
guide only as an effort to bolster the importance of state and local law enforcement, 
evidence exists of their role in being the first to encounter terrorism. The initial law 
enforcement first responders on 9/11 were Port Authority and New York Police 
Department personnel. Patrol officers were also responsible for the apprehension of Eric 
Rudolph8 and Timothy McVeigh.9  
A review of the literature on the role of law enforcement in securing the maritime 
domain reveals that a large volume of writing has been focused on federal agencies. 
These agencies have federal statute designated roles and responsibilities regarding 
maritime homeland security. Writing focused on non-federal maritime law enforcement 
agencies has centered primarily on agency specific programs and practices. What appears 
to be missing from the literature on this topic is an overview of the roles shared by local 
                                                 
7 Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke, Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide (Cooperative 
Agreement Number 2007-CK-WX-K008) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2008), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p143-pub.pdf. 
8 Yahoo News, “10 Years Later: The Rookie Police Officer Who Caught Eric Rudolph,” May 20, 
2013, http://news.yahoo.com/10-years-later-rookie-police-officer-caught-eric-195600576.html.  
9 Routes. “McVeigh’s Capture a Defining Moment for Town,” May 20, 2010, 
http://routes.ou.edu/?p=60.  
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law enforcement agencies across the United States. A second piece missing from the 
literature is an analysis of whether existing practices and training shared by local law 
enforcement agencies is sufficient for local law enforcements roles. 
Government documents create the requirement, mandate, or guidance for 
maritime homeland security. In the case of presidential directives, they define the domain 
and establish the approach to be taken by the United States. These initial mandates or 
directives translate into strategies, which are then implemented by federal, state, and local 
agencies. Once these strategies become plans, they become studies evaluated by 
academics, or their successes are highlighted in congressional reports.  
1. Government Documents 
In the aftermath of 9/11, a myriad of strategy documents, presidential directives, 
and other documents began to shape the homeland security enterprise. A recurring theme 
in these documents is the need to secure the maritime domain and the importance of 
coordination between federal, state, and local agencies. The first of these documents was 
the MTSA of 2002.10 This document discusses federal agency roles and responsibilities, 
as well as identifies the need for interaction with state and local law enforcement 
agencies. Another theme within this document is the need for agencies to understand the 
threat environment in the maritime domain. This understanding was to extend to vessels, 
facilities, and buildings with the intent of providing appropriate security measures to 
these areas. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the authors of MTSA also used this seminal document as 
a way to build two very important components of port security. First, through the 
“findings”11 at the beginning of the document, MTSA outlines the diverse activities 
occurring within ports, the importance of securing points of entry and international 
boundaries of ports, and discusses the complexities of securing the vast maritime domain. 
Second, MTSA begins to build the framework for securing the ports. This framework has 
                                                 
10 “Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295 (2002),” accessed January 28, 
2015, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ295/pdf/PLAW-107publ295.pdf. 
11 Ibid., 4, 5. 
 8 
a strong focus on the USCG,12 but also mentions the United States Customs Service,13 
and its importance in screening incoming cargo. 
Subsequent federal government documents build upon the MTSA to provide a 
strategic framework for how the maritime domain should be secured. The plans and 
strategies that supported the MTSA include the National Maritime Security Strategy 
(NMSS) of 2005.14 This document identifies the importance and scope of the maritime 
environment for national security; it identifies threats to maritime security, and it lays out 
strategic objectives and actions to be taken. Two of these actions include obtaining 
maritime domain awareness and deploying layered security. While the NMSS began to 
shape the identification of threats and actions that should be taken to mitigate these 
threats, other supporting documents were required to continue to develop the security of 
the maritime domain. Supporting the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) 
are a series of seven implementation plans that provide for maritime security: 
• National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan (NMDAP) 
• Maritime Operations Threat Response Plan (MOTR) 
• International Outreach and Coordination Strategy 
• Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP) 
• Maritime Transportation System Security Plan (MTSS) 
• Maritime Commerce Security Plan (MCSP) 
• Domestic Outreach Plan15 
Summarizing the aforementioned listed plans, they outline actions related to 
awareness, response, coordination, recovery, and security. As outlined in the NMDAP, 
these plans serve to provide a “comprehensive national effort to promote global economic 
                                                 
12 “Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295 (2002),” 6–72. 
13 Ibid., 26, 27. 
14 White House, National Maritime Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2005), 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html. 
15 White House, National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan for the National Strategy for Maritime 
Security (Washington, DC: White House, 2013), ii, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ 
national_maritime_domain_awareness_plan.pdf.  
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security, protect legitimate activities, mitigate the effects of natural disasters, and prevent 
hostile and illegal acts affecting the maritime domain.”16 These plans provide broad 
guidance to U.S. ports and how matters of port security should be addressed. Guidance 
includes priorities for port security and what are considered critical capabilities in 
maritime homeland security efforts.  
Limited research is available that studies the effectiveness of port security 
practices. One study, a 2008 report produced for the Department of Justice highlighted 
general port security practices across 17 U.S. ports. This study looked at “promising 
practices” arising from local agencies involved in port security.17 A portion of this 
research project looked at practices of state and local law enforcement agencies and 
highlighted programs in place in the 17 studied ports. One of the author’s observations 
was that extensive study and documentation of federal agencies and programs has been 
done, but very little has been done to “rigorously study state and local agencies in their 
port security roles.”18 The recovery phase of the homeland security event cycle was one 
area examined in this study that the researchers learned “about fewer promising 
practices,”19 as compared to the other phases of the cycle.  
An opportunity exists to expand on the research completed in this study. 
Specifically, rather than looking primarily at unique practices across ports, finding 
common themes could provide great benefit to the state and local agencies confronting 
similar maritime homeland security challenges. Also, having experts converge in an 
anonymous survey environment to bring some level of scrutiny to the maritime homeland 
security practices of state and local law enforcement could provide insight into the value 
and success of current practices. 
                                                 
16 White House, National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan, ii. 
17 Antony Pate, Bruce Taylor, and Bruce Kubu, Protecting America’s Ports: Promising Practices 
(Rockville, MD: National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
grants/221075.pdf. 
18 Ibid., 6.  
19 Ibid., 105. 
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2. Scholarship 
Various theses have focused on the USCG, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Customs and Border Protection, and the United States Navy and each of these agencies’ 
responsibilities in maritime domain security. The USCG as the primary federal maritime 
law enforcement agency has statutory enforcement authority for all “applicable federal 
laws on, under and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.”20 With this broad federal statute authority, the USCG is the federal agency most 
often referenced in maritime law enforcement academic literature. Theses have focused 
on USCG past, present and future programs and anticipated challenges for this agency. 
Regarding port security programs, examples have included the small vessel security 
strategy program21 or proposals for implementing maritime security related strategies. 
In his March 2011 thesis, “The Fire Service’s Role in Maritime Homeland 
Security,” Seattle Fire Department Captain Paul Foerster explored how the fire service 
fits in the context of maritime homeland security.22 This thesis employed a survey 
method and focused on federal programs, such as HOMEPORT and the Area Maritime 
Security Committee, as avenues for the fire service to reinforce the importance of its 
maritime homeland security mission. This research is important in that it examined how 
state and local first responder agencies, in this case the fire service, fit into the federal 
efforts for maritime and port security. The author also made a strong case for the fire 
service venturing beyond its fire suppression or emergency medical services role and 
asserted the value of having firefighters better integrated with homeland security efforts. 
Foerster’s rationale is germane to this research because of seeking a better understanding 
of the maritime homeland security mission of state and local agencies operating in an 
environment of federal guidance and requirements. It also considered not only the current 
state, but what other avenues are available.  
                                                 
20 “14 U.S.C. § 2-Primary Duties ch. 393, 63 Stat. 496 (1949),” accessed August 31, 2015, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/14/2.  
21 Brian Hill, “Maritime Terrorism and the Small Boat Threat to the United States: A Proposed 
Response” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=232151. 
22 Paul Foerster, “The Fire Service’s Role in Maritime Homeland Security” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2011).  
 11 
Federally focused theses have considered the effectiveness of federal programs or 
have studied expanding the role of agencies to enhance homeland security. Dirk 
Sonnenberg, a lieutenant in the United States Navy, posed the hypothesis of utilizing the 
U.S. Navy as a maritime law enforcement agency.23 Sonnenberg identified certain cases 
in which it was already legally allowed (piracy on the high seas), but he asserted that 
failing to expand this capability for the Navy left gaps in the vulnerabilities of the United 
States. This thesis also identifies the importance of law enforcement as a mechanism for 
countering threats to maritime homeland security. The effectiveness of law enforcement 
in this arena, coupled with the availability and capability of the Navy, were Sonnenberg’s 
basis for better utilizing the Navy in this mission.  
The aforementioned theses have played an important role in exploring 
possibilities or the potential for enhancing homeland security missions of existing 
agencies. Both looked at existing practices and how they could be leveraged to strengthen 
maritime homeland security better. 
Academic writing about non-federal agency maritime security has focused on 
location or agency specific programs and initiatives. When non-federal agencies are 
referenced in the literature of federal programs, these documents typically reference 
improving coordination with non-federal agencies, or they highlight specific non-federal 
agency participation in a federal program. 
Whether due to the broad guidance provided by government directives and plans, 
or the focused nature of academic writing to address jurisdiction specific maritime 
homeland security concerns, a study or sense of how state and local agencies have 
approached the challenges of maritime homeland security is missing. Having obtained 
this look at what exists from a best or smart practices perspective, how can these 
practices be shared to identify and leverage innovative maritime homeland security 
efforts nationwide? 
                                                 
23 Dirk Sonnenberg, “Maritime Law Enforcement: A Critical Capability for the Navy?” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012).  
 12 
The scope of this research is limited. First, the six agencies surveyed for this 
research represent a very small percentage of the primary and secondary responding state 
and local law enforcement agencies that have responsibilities related to maritime 
homeland security. When considering that the United States has 361 ports, and each of 
these ports has several state or local agencies with some police or maritime homeland 
security obligations within this domain, the author recognized that more than 1,000 
agencies potentially could have shared practices related to maritime homeland security. 
Recognizing the relatively small number of agencies surveyed as a limiting factor for this 
research, he attempted to make a case for why these agencies and the ports they police 
were important in the context of best practices for maritime homeland security. This 
research was dependent entirely on the self-identification of maritime homeland security 
experts for each port. It was also dependent upon the self-reporting and verification of 
maritime homeland security information these experts deemed accurate and important to 
this research. Where possible, the author verified information provided by these port 
experts. Additionally, he compared the experiences and responses of these port experts 
with his own experiences working in the field of maritime homeland security for more 
than 20 years.  
The responses provided by these maritime homeland security experts represent 
subjective perspectives, based upon the experts’ respective experiences and the author’s 
subjective development of questions related to this topic. Where possible, he attempted to 
develop questions that asked open-ended questions to elicit narrative responses. His hope 
was to use the responses of these experts as a measure to determine if they understood the 
questions asked of them. While the subjective nature of the questions and responses 
limits this research, value exists in determining trends that may occur in the important 
field of maritime homeland security. The value of surveying these experts, independent 
of each other, lends to their responses being untainted by the opinions or responses of the 
other experts.  
Second, the questions developed for the author’s research surveys were based 
upon his experiences, as well as some previous research on similar related topics. These 
questions are limited in their scope. His hope in developing these questions was to leave 
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them somewhat open-ended and allow the respondent experts to provide feedback based 
upon both their understanding of the questions and their respective experiences working 
in the maritime homeland security field. One of the most obvious limiting factors of this 
type of questioning is that it lends itself to bias on the part of the survey question 
developer, as well as the survey question respondent. Anytime questions on such a 
widespread topic, such as maritime homeland security are developed, the questions must 
be narrowed to particular fields of interest, and by default, other questions outside that 
area of interest must be eliminated. Correspondingly, the responses to these limited 
questions will focus as the respondent understands them in the narrow context they were 
presented. 
Third, and finally, this research focused almost entirely on the practices of state 
and local agencies. The author recognizes that maritime homeland security as a broad 
topic is not a practice only of these agencies. Rather, it is a partnership across agencies 
public and private, concerned businesses and citizens, visitors to the area and others. It 
was not the author’s intent to exclude those outside of state and local law enforcement. 
Rather, it was his hope that by limiting his research to one dimension of the maritime 
homeland security model, he might be able to present meaningful responses from state 
and local law enforcement agencies and explain why they are important to the maritime 
homeland security mission.  
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In Chapter II, this research provides background and identifies the threats (one 
component of the DHS risk matrix) facing America’s ports and examines what has been 
done to address these threats.  
In Chapter III, the methodology for conducting this research is described. The 
Delphi Method survey and its iterative process anonymous debate are discussed. The 
selection of the ports is also outlined. 
Chapter IV discusses the first round of survey questions and responses received in 
each of the following categories: best practices, lessons learned, as well as future 
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challenges and opportunities. This chapter includes a summary of the themes and topics 
identified by the surveyed maritime homeland security experts.  
Chapter V continues the survey results into the second or supplemental round of 
survey questions. Based on the first round of survey questions, these supplemental 
questions were selected to narrow the focus and find consensus within the experts’ 
responses. 
The final chapter summarizes what has been learned through this research. 
Important opportunities for the future are also identified, and conclusions are drawn 
about the implications to the field and future study of maritime homeland security. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The deliberate misuse of the maritime domain to commit harmful, hostile, 
or unlawful acts, including those against the maritime transportation 
system, remains an enduring threat to the safety and security of the 
American people, to wider U.S. national security interests, and to the 
interests of our international allies and private sector partners. 
— The White House, Presidential Policy Directive 18 
A. IDENTIFYING THE THREAT 
The threat to U.S. ports is best identified within the context of the environment, or 
as identified by NPSD/Homeland Security Directive, the “maritime domain.”24 Maritime 
domain reflects the challenge for state and local law enforcement in securing ports, as 
this domain includes facilities, people, areas, waterways and anything else within, under, 
or around U.S. ports. Due to this wide array of security considerations for ports, 
simplifying the threat by identifying broad categories of what might be targeted within 
ports or what types of activities might be encountered within the maritime environment, 
can be an effective way of better understanding the threat. Ports essentially face two 
types of threats: 
• Threats that seek to make use of ports and their interconnection to a 
national transportation network. Criminal networks, as an example, may 
seek to use ports as gateways to transport contraband through the 
legitimate modes of transportation. Terrorists as well, seeking to introduce 
weapons or destructive devices, may utilize the transportation network in 
place to support legitimate trade and commerce. 
• Threats that target ports or something in the maritime domain, because of 
the importance to larger national security or economic interests. Natural or 
human caused events may target ports and disrupt the facilities, 
transportation nodes, commerce flows, or other legitimate activities 
occurring within this domain.  
Due to their accessibility by intermodal transportation routes through the land and 
sea, ports are inherently vulnerable to attacks. Indeed, the aspects of their usefulness for 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
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supporting rapid movement of goods across the country are the same factors that make 
them vulnerable to criminal and terrorist exploitation. One incident outside of the United 
States that clearly depicts how easily accessed ports might be exploited for a terrorist 
operation was also one of the most deadly terrorist attacks in the last five years. In 
Mumbai, India, 10 armed terrorists attacked several targets within the city in a prolonged 
siege that played out over the course of 60 hours.25 The terrorists hijacked a vessel 
outside of the port and then used an inflatable dinghy to get to shore. Through a 
combination of bombs and firearms, these terrorists attacked different target sites near the 
port, killing 173 people. The Mumbai attacks are important in the context of the threat to 
port security and the maritime domain, because they are illustrative of the challenges 
ports face in securing this domain. Easy access by sea, the ability to walk to diverse types 
of targets (hotels, restaurants, movie theaters, train terminals, and hospitals), heavily 
populated/trafficked areas, and unsecured facilities, were all components that contributed 
to the success of the Mumbai attacks. 
Assessing the threat to U.S. ports, it might be considered whether this attack 
scenario could be played out domestically. Indeed, the response may be different in the 
United States, but many of the same factors that contributed to the terrorists’ success in 
Mumbai could be translated to U.S. ports. As mentioned earlier in this research, ports are 
connected to transportation networks, often are adjacent to major metropolitan areas, and 
are often sprawling complexes with many different access points by land and sea. 
Conventional attacks within ports, near heavily populated metropolitan areas, pose a 
serious threat and a potential for consequences to critical infrastructure and human life. 
Non-conventional incidents are also an emerging homeland security concern, and 
the threat posed by these types of attacks is a potential homeland security vulnerability 
within the maritime domain. Commander Joseph Kramek (USCG) identified this concern 
                                                 
25 Angela Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Barbara, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2009/RAND_OP249.pdf.  
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in a policy paper developed for the Brookings Institute.26 In this paper, Kramek discusses 
the use of PSGP funds, how they have been applied in port security, and the vulnerability 
that has been created by ignoring the cyber threats to port security. Kramek argues that 
state and local agencies have overlooked this vulnerability and applied funds to more 
conventional threat scenarios. He summarizes the projects funded under port security as 
supporting “guns, gates, guards and identification cards.”27 
In support of his assertion about ports’ vulnerability to cyber attacks, Kramek 
points out that U.S. ports have allocated approximately 0.2% ($6 million out of $2.6 
billion) of their PSGP funds to cyber security projects.28 Kramek also asserts that this 
threat is greatly misunderstood, and that vulnerability assessments and response plans 
need to be developed in these port areas. 
Summarizing the threat to U.S. ports, they face a significant challenge in securing 
their respective environment because of the all-encompassing nature of the maritime 
domain. Ports face the added challenge of having to be address threats emanating from 
the land or the sea. It could be argued that they are vulnerable to a wide array of attacks 
from conventional firearms (active shooters) to sophisticated cyber attacks targeting 
technology systems that automate operations and operate to secure the maritime domain.  
B. PROGRESS SINCE 9/11 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the federal government established grant programs to 
bridge the gap between pre-9/11 and post-9/11 first responder capabilities. For ports 
across the United States, grant funding for promoting port security has been allocated for 
more than a decade. Most recently, in August 2013, PSGP allocations of $93 million 
were focused on 145 critical ports. These allocations targeted the following priorities: 
 
                                                 
26 Joseph Kramek, The Critical Infrastructure Gap: U.S. Port Facilities and Cyber Vulnerabilities,” 
Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2013), http:// 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/07/02%20cyber%20port%20security%20kramek/
03%20cyber%20port%20security%20kramek.pdf. 
27 Kramek, Critical Infrastructure Gap, 8. 
28 Ibid., v. 
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• increasing port-wide risk management 
• enhancing domain awareness 
• training and exercises 
• expanding port recovery and resiliency 
• having the capabilities to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from 
attacks involving improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or other non-
conventional weapons29 
Of the 145 critical ports, these ports were grouped into 90 port areas, with seven 
being Group I or the highest risk ports. These Group I ports received $55 million of the 
$100 million available to “promote sustainable, risk-based efforts to protect critical port 
infrastructure from terrorism.”30 These funding allocations reflect the DHS’ focus on 
providing the most at risk ports with the greatest percentage (55%) of available port 
security funds. As mentioned previously in this research, changes in funding do not 
reflect changes in risk. Additionally, efforts to ensure effective implementation of 
projects and use of allocated funding need to be strengthened.  
Based upon this grouping, the DHS determines the priority for homeland security 
project related funding. Under this risk assessment model and the PSGP, the DHS has 
allocated funding to ports for use in reducing risk and mitigating the threat encountered 
within these ports. 
To address the threat to U.S. ports, the federal government has developed a 
system of assessing risk to ports, has identified the USCG as the federal agency 
responsible agency for securing ports, has developed port security priorities, and has 
allocated funding to address capabilities within those priorities.31 
                                                 
29 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Funding Opportunity Announcement FY 2014 Port 




31 “Homeland Security Act of 2002 (2002),” 36, accessed February 14, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/ 
homeland-security-act-2002.  
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Under the oversight of the USCG and the Captain of the Port (COTP) assigned to 
USCG sectors, maritime homeland security has developed a collaborative system of 
identifying threats, developing plans to address those threats, and exercising the plans to 
enhance preparedness. The collaborative system previously referenced is outlined in USC 
33 CFR Part 103 and includes authorities of the USCG COTP, assembly of committees, 
development of plans, use of maritime security (MARSEC) threat levels, and 
coordination of other maritime homeland security functions.32 In the decade since this 
regulation was developed, these USCG functions have been developed into 43 COTP 
zones and the requirements of this regulatory system are in place. 
State and local agencies have been partners with the USCG and the development 
of the maritime homeland security system that has emerged since 9/11. These agencies 
are included within the committees in their ports, are participants in plans and exercises, 
and have been recipients of PSGP funds to enhance port security capabilities. Law 
enforcement agencies under these state and local entities are often the initial response 
mechanism for criminal and terrorism incidents occurring within the maritime domain. 
To understand the complete picture of maritime homeland security better, the study of 
these agencies’ practices is an essential piece of the complex system of security within 
ports.  
As referenced earlier in this research and identified in a November 2011 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on management and effectiveness of 
risk models and grants in port security, ports have “characteristics that make them 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks: they are sprawling, easily accessible by water and land, 
close to crowded metropolitan areas, and interwoven with complex transportation 
networks designed to move cargo and commerce as quickly as possible.”33 The 
geographic factors, as well as the tight connection of port networks, provide the 
                                                 
32 “Overview of Area Maritime Security Regulations, 33 C.F.R. Part 103 (2003),” accessed August 25, 
2015, http://www.aapa-ports.org/files/pdfs/overview_area_maritime_security_regulations.pdf. 
33 United States Government Accountability Office, Port Security Grant Program, Risk Model, Grant 
Management, and Effectiveness Measures Could Be Strengthened (GAO-12-47) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2011), 5, http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf.  
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framework within which state and local law enforcement operate and must demonstrate 
the ability to adapt. 
As a result of continued vulnerability of ports to conventional and unconventional 
attacks, due to the inability to identify reduction in risk in ports after more than a decade 
of PSGP projects and funding, and to develop a clearer understanding of the practices of 
state and local law enforcement within the complex system of maritime homeland 
security, it is essential to collect data from some of these ports and identify best practices 
to enhance port and maritime homeland security across the United States. Identifying 
these practices and to what extent they represent adaptation continues the dialog about 
the current status of maritime homeland security and presents an opportunity to prompt 




The method utilized by the author in this research is important due to a number of 
factors. First, when narrowing the field of prospective ports from hundreds down to six, it 
is important to explain the characteristics of these ports and why they are important to the 
maritime homeland security discussion. Ultimately, the ports were selected due to their 
importance to national defense or commerce, or because of their relatively high risk 
rating. Second, selecting six experts from thousands of men and women working in the 
maritime homeland security field requires thoughtful consideration. The experts were 
selected because they and their respective agencies play an integral role in securing the 
selected ports. Finally, an iterative survey process was important, as little research had 
been completed in this field of study.  
A. PORT SELECTION 
Of the 361 ports in the United States, three criteria were used to determine which 
of these ports would be considered in this research. The ports selected for study were 
either high risk, important to commerce, or critical for the strategic defense of the United 
States. Ideally, this author sought to study ports that met more than one of the listed 
criteria areas.  
1. DHS Group Ports 
Between 2006 and 2012, the DHS invested over $2.6 billion for maritime security 
through its PSGP.34 The allocations for this grant program are determined through a DHS 
risk model, which divides U.S. ports into Group I and Group II ports. Group I ports are 
those determined by the DHS to have the highest level of risk, and Group II ports are all 
remaining ports. For 2014, the PSGP identified seven port areas as being Group I ports. 
These seven port areas, port clusters near a geographic area, were comprised of 98 total 
                                                 
34 United States Government Accountability Office, Port Security Grant Program.  
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entities in nine different states. The 98 entities within these port areas were a mix of state, 
local, tribal, public, and private agencies, and corporations.35  
The seven Group I ports received an allocation of 55% (approximately  
$55 million) of the total $100 million available through the PSGP. Remaining ports 
(Group II ports) were able to compete for the remaining $45 million of PSGP funds. 
Table 1 illustrates the list of Group I port areas, as well as the states, territories, and cities 
represented.36  
Table 1.   FY 2014 PSGP Port Area Groupings 
State/Territory Port Area 
California Los Angeles/Long Beach 
Long Beach, Los Angeles 
San Francisco Bay 
Carquinez Strait, Martinez, Oakland 
Richmond, San Francisco, Stockton 
Louisiana New Orleans 
Baton Rouge, Gramercy, New Orleans, 
Port Plaquemines, South Louisiana, St. 
Rose 
New Jersey / Pennsylvania / 
Delaware 
Delaware Bay 
Camden-Gloucester, NJ; Chester, PA; 
Marcus Hook, PA; New Castle, DE; 
Paulsboro, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; 
Trenton, NJ; Wilmington, DE 
New York / New Jersey New York/New Jersey 
Texas Houston-Galveston 
Houston, Galveston, Texas City 
Washington Puget Sound 
Anacortes, Bellingham, Everett, Olympia 
Port Angeles, Seattle, Tacoma 
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Funding Opportunity Announcement 
(FOA) FY 2014 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security, 2104), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1396623742630-9e4 
97a99bef3e3c0265bbf84993b5e69/FY_2014_PSGP_FOA_Final_Revised.pdf. 
                                                 
35 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) FY 2014 
Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2104), 
http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1396623742630-9e497a99bef3e3c0265bbf84993b5e69/FY_ 
2014_PSGP_FOA_Final_Revised.pdf. 
36 Ibid., 28. 
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Although a concerted effort has been made to develop priorities and allocate 
federal grant funding through the PSGP, challenges have arisen with regard to the 
funding and how it is being used to enhance maritime homeland security. A November 
2011 GAO report asserted that the management of these funds and the measures of 
effectiveness of this program should be strengthened.37 Specifically, the report noted, 
“allocations were based largely on port risk and determined through a combination of a 
risk analysis model and DHS implementation decisions.” The report acknowledges that 
the reason this method poses a challenge is that it is not responsive to changes in port 
security practices, as occurs when new practices, projects, or programs are 
implemented.38 To simplify this concern, the DHS has implemented a methodology for 
assessing the risk faced by U.S. ports. Based upon this methodology, the DHS allocates 
funding to ports to enhance homeland security and reduce risk in the maritime domain.  
Another major concern identified in the report was a measure of the 
implementation of the projects funded through the PSGP. As identified in the report, only 
about 25% of the funds allocated through this program have been used. PSGP 
performance measures are needed to measure the effectiveness of how the funds are 
being used within ports to reduce risk and affect changes in homeland security 
In 2015, the PSGP eliminated the grouping of ports by their respective risk 
classification. All ports competing for PSGP funding were clustered together to compete 
for the $100 million in funding, irrespective of their relative risk rating. This change by 
the DHS that removed the consideration of “risk” as a measure of how PSGP funds 
would be allocated necessitates an examination of what other evaluative criteria might 
exist to determine the importance of ports within the United States. In addition to risk, 
what other factors could be considered when evaluating how ports have approached the 
challenge of maritime homeland security? Given the changes in the PSGP since its 
inception, it may be prudent to consider factors other than a risk rating to determine 
which ports may have maritime homeland security practices that may be leveraged. This 
research does not discard the DHS criteria of risk, but also considers variables related to 
                                                 
37 United States Government Accountability Office, Port Security Grant Program. 
38 Ibid., 20. 
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ports and their importance to commerce, as well as ports deemed strategically important 
to the DOD. 
2. MARAD Top Ten Commercial Ports 
Ports “share certain characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorist attacks: 
they are sprawling, easily accessible by water and land, close to crowded metropolitan 
areas, and interwoven with complex transportation networks designed to move cargo and 
commerce as quickly as possible.”39 Importance to the economy and port ties to larger 
national security matters are two other elements that must be considered in the discussion 
of U.S. ports and maritime homeland security. Recognizing their national economic 
importance, the United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) lists the top ten 
commercial ports within the United States. With 90% of the U.S. commerce traveling 
through ports and their connection to intermodal transportation nodes, incidents that 
impact U.S. ports quickly reverberate through this network. Disruptions to trade and 
shipping, regardless of cause, are translated into national economic impact. As identified 
in a 2013 MARAD report on commercial ports, the following ports are the top ten ports 
for all types of commerce:40 
• Houston, TX 
• Los Angeles/Long Beach, CA 
• New York, NY 
• San Francisco, CA 
• Virginia Ports, VA 
• New Orleans, LA 
• Columbia River 
• Savannah, GA 
• Philadelphia, PA 
• Baltimore, MD 
 
                                                 
39 United States Government Accountability Office, Port Security Grant Program, 5. 
40 Maritime Administration, 2011 U.S. Water Transportation Statistical Snapshot (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013), 13, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/US_Water_Trans 
portation_Statistical_snapshot.pdf.  
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3. DOD Strategic Ports 
The other important aspect of ports considered in this research is the national 
security or critical military component attached to them. Twenty-two (seventeen 
commercial and five military) ports in the United States have received the designation of 
strategic ports. Figure 2 illustrates the list of ports and their respective locations in the 
United States.41 The DOD Secretary determines which ports are strategic based on their 
designation as “significant transportation hubs important to the readiness and cargo 
handling capacity of the Department of Defense.”42  
Figure 2.  Strategic Seaport Locations 
 
Source: United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Logistics: The 
Department of Defense’s Report on Strategic Seaports Addressed All Congressionally 
Directed Elements (GAO-13-511RSU) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Account 
ability Office, 2013), 8, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654578.pdf.  
                                                 
41 United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Logistics: The Department of Defense’s 
Report on Strategic Seaports Addressed All Congressionally Directed Elements (GAO-13-511RSU) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 8, http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/6545 
78.pdf.  
42 Ibid., 7. 
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The DOD makes this determination based upon these ports’ value in maintaining 
the ability to dock, load, and unload military vessels, personnel, and equipment. Indeed, 
many of the factors that make ports essential to the transport of trade and commerce are 
the same factors that the DOD requires to receive and deploy rapidly equipment and 
personnel necessary for national security matters. These strategic ports are part of a 
complex worldwide system that allows the DOD to transport equipment and personnel 
for military operations. Activities include the use of commercial facilities to re-supply 
and load (roll on and roll off) equipment to be shipped overseas, or to receive equipment 
and personnel upon returning from overseas.  
Figure 3 illustrates how many ports constitute the DHS Group I port areas, the 
DOD strategic ports, and the MARAD top ten commercial ports.  
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B. SELECTION CRITERIA 
Ports that converge across two or more of the DOD Strategic, MARAD top ten 
commercial, and DHS grouped ports were selected for this survey. The rationale for 
focusing on ports that converge in two or more of the above listed areas is the belief that 
these ports are not only high-risk, but also important to the national economy, and the 
defense of this country. They must balance interaction with the military and consideration 
of a higher security posture in areas of the port. Or these ports, because of their 
importance to U.S. commerce, may have a greater need to balance business 
considerations along with security and risk concerns. Rather than merely facing a 
significant risk, based upon a threat, vulnerability, and consequence formula, these ports 
represent great impact to the movement of commerce and military resources.  
The author’s purpose in structuring the survey was to capture data from ports that 
have the greatest element of risk, are important for homeland defense, and are vital to the 
U.S. economy. Evaluating this data could provide insight about balancing elements of 
security and defense, while also supporting an environment conducive to the flow of 
commerce.  
Reviewing the list of DHS Group I Ports, DOD Strategic Ports, and MARAD top 
ten ports, reveals the following information: 
• Three ports are listed as Group I ports, DOD strategic ports and MARAD 
top ten ports (Long Beach, CA; Philadelphia, PA; and New York, NY). 
• Three ports are DHS Group I and MARAD top ten ports (San Francisco, 
CA; New Orleans, LA; and Houston, TX). 
• Two ports are listed as DOD Strategic Ports and MARAD top ten ports 
(Savannah, Georgia and Virginia Ports, VA). 
• Two ports are DHS Group I and DOD strategic ports (Tacoma, WA; 
Oakland CA; and San Diego, CA). 
For the purposes of this research, the author placed the highest priority on seeking 
the participation of ports that will provide the widest or most diverse perspective of risk, 
defense, and commerce. The ports of Long Beach, Philadelphia, and New York provide 
this perspective as identified by the DHS, DOD, and MARAD. Two ports from each of 
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the remaining groups are pursued for participation in the survey. Based upon the author’s 
research, the following ports are sought for participation: 
Three ports from the DHS Group I and MARAD lists: 
• San Francisco, CA 
• New Orleans, LA 
• Houston, TX 
Both DOD Strategic and MARAD top ten ports: 
• Savannah, GA 
• Virginia Ports, VA 
Two DOD Strategic and DHS Group I ports: 
• Tacoma, WA 
• Oakland, CA 
It is important to note that while only one city is identified in each port, these 
areas are comprised of port complexes encompassing more than one city. The PSGP 
allocates funds to port areas that are representative of more than one agency or 
jurisdiction. For 2014, seven port areas were listed as “Group I ports.” In actuality, these 
areas spanned more than 34 cities and 98 public private, state, local, and tribal entities 
within those port areas.  
C. EXPERT SELECTION 
By focusing on agencies identified as DHS high-risk ports, DOD strategic ports, 
and MARAD top ten commercial ports, the author reached out to agencies across the 
country through phone and email exchanges. His hope was to develop a group of 
respondents that had law enforcement and maritime homeland security responsibilities in 
geographic areas not clustered in a certain region in hopes of avoiding responses only 
from west coast ports as an example. This geographic diversity was important, because it 
could help to demonstrate that effective practices were or were not confined to one part 
of the United States. It could also serve as a measure to indicate practices only employed 
in one region of the United States. 
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Following contact by phone or email with these agencies, the author sought to 
identify the individual(s) within each agency who met the criteria identified to respond to 
his surveys. In a couple of instances, he was referred by the initial agency he contacted to 
a second agency with more specific expertise in maritime homeland security 
responsibilities. Each agency representative received a letter of introduction and brief 
explanation of the purpose of my research.  
From the contacts with these agencies, he received six responses agreeing to 
complete the surveys and assist with his research. 
D. DELPHI METHOD SURVEY 
Once the ports and their respective experts to participate in the author’s surveys 
were identified, he adapted the Delphi Method to conduct two rounds of survey questions 
with each of the experts. Olaf Helmer of the RAND Corporation explored the basic 
elements of the Delphi Method in a paper he authored in March 1967.43 This method is 
employed when limited information may be available on a topic, to collect subject 
experts’ responses in a structured and controlled survey environment. None of the 
participants is known to the other, and these experts engage in “anonymous debate” to 
reveal a combined position.44 Innovative avenues may be discovered as a result of one 
expert identifying a practice in which others have engaged. Additionally, if the group of 
experts believes a given practice is needed but has not yet been implemented, it could 
indicate a possible avenue to explore in future port security projects or research. 
This research used elements of the Delphi Method, not for the purpose of 
forecasting the future, but to learn about what successful practices in maritime homeland 
security may exist across the country.  
The goal of this survey method was to determine indicators of successful 
practices, trends, and possible avenues where innovation may be taking place. This 
research sought to expand upon interesting practices given the maritime environment, the 
                                                 
43 Olaf Helmer, Analysis of the Future: The Delphi Method (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand 
Corporation, 1967), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P3558.pdf. 
44 Ibid., 9. 
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complexities of securing the maritime domain, and the constraints placed upon state and 
local law enforcement agencies.  
In collecting data about smart practices, trends, and innovation within state and 
local law enforcement in the field of maritime homeland security, it is this author’s hope 
that the result will be some type of measure or initiation of a dialog about the extent to 
which these agencies have adapted to securing the maritime domain in the aftermath of 9/
11. The concept of adaptation, and the failure of government agencies to do so, is a 
concept espoused by Amy Zegart in her book, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the 
Origins of 9/11.45 She asserts that three “important ideas” are attached to the concept of 
adaptation. First, some measure of change must occur. Second, adaptation requires large 
changes or a combination of smaller changes, changes that on a scale of magnitude that 
transform an organization. The third and final element required for adaptation is an 
“improved fit between the organization and its external environment.” Measuring these 
three factors seems to be a good fit for the discussion of best practices and maritime 
homeland security. Especially important in this discussion is the final concept of state and 
local law enforcement and measuring to what extent they have improved their capabilities 
in the complex system of the maritime domain.  
Summarizing the three elements of adaptation and applying them to the scope of 
this research, the intent is to collect data that reflects the extent to which state and local 
law enforcement have significantly changed their practices to adapt effectively to a 
changing maritime domain. As used in this description, the term “significant” reflects 
both the magnitude of the change, as well as the extent to which that change is reflective 
of the changing maritime environment. This concept also links well with “smart 
practices,” as adaptation assumes an awareness and understanding of changes around it 
and is an intentional action in response. 
The data collected was categorized by identifying common themes that evaluate 
the following: 
                                                 
45 Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, in 2007. 
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• Best practices—This section of the survey asked agencies to identify 
successful practices within four maritime homeland security categories: 
federal programs, state programs, training, and homeland security cycle 
successes.  
• Lessons learned—Agencies were surveyed about the challenges they had 
faced within the realm of maritime homeland security. Specifically, each 
agency was asked what challenges they had faced regarding federal 
programs, state programs, and the homeland security cycle (identified as 
prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery). 
• Future Challenges—Agencies were queried about what future challenges 
they anticipated in the realm of maritime homeland security. A second 
question asked about challenges related to the budget and how they would 
affect their agency’s operations. 
• Future Opportunities—Surveyed agencies were asked about two areas of 
future opportunities. First, agencies were asked about opportunities to 
better prepare or equip their agencies for the maritime homeland security 
mission. Second, agencies were asked about how federal programs might 
be changed to prepare or equip their agencies better for the maritime 
homeland security mission.  
As this survey utilizes the Delphi Method, the responses from agency 
representatives, the goal of this research is to begin to fill a void in research by soliciting 
anonymous subject matter expert responses. The key to the effectiveness of this Delphi 
Method survey in the present research project is the selection of relevant ports and 
“experts”46 to participate in the interviews. Selection of ports from only one geographic 
region in the United States would be at the exclusion of smart practices or trends in other 
parts of the country. Additionally, the selection of experts who are in a position to know 
not only what is being done (or not being done) in their port and why it is important to 
that port is a key component to this research. This component will allow for qualitative 
elements, as opposed to completely quantitative data, which is essential for understanding 
the system of maritime homeland security that has emerged for state and local law 
enforcement. The search for the defensible case for how these agencies have 
implemented their systems of port security is at the core of this research. 
                                                 
46 Helmer, Analysis of the Future: The Delphi Method, 4. 
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E. RECRUITMENT OF RESPONDENTS 
By selecting the ports based upon the aforementioned listed designations, the 
author believes it would provide a sample of diverse geographic areas and port security 
practices, while also offering a manageable sample size to analyze and evaluate the data 
received. He sent a total of 10 inquiries to ports that met at least two of the list criteria 
and received six responses. Selection of the experts to represent each of the previously 
listed port areas was based upon the following criteria: 
• be employed by a state or local law enforcement agency whose duties 
include providing port security or maritime law enforcement duties 
• fill a position within one of these agencies that has knowledge of 
operations related to port security and maritime law enforcement 
• be able to provide perspective about changes in their agencies’ and their 
ports’ security and law enforcement system since 9/11 
F. SURVEY  
The author synthesized the questions based both upon his own experiences 
working with a maritime law enforcement agency, and his hope to probe areas of 
uncertainty. The first round of survey questions consisted of five areas of inquiry, totaling 
25 questions. First, general questions were asked of each agency to provide information 
about the agency responding to the survey. These general questions included the name 
and size of the agency, the role of the respondent within that agency, operational 
commitments for this agency in the realm of port security, and any budget changes the 
agency had experienced.  
Second, best practices questions were utilized as a method to probe areas that 
each agency could identify as having been successful in its port area. Third, the lessons 
learned question asked about areas each agency had identified as challenging. Fourth, 
agencies were asked to evaluate areas they believed would pose future challenges. Fifth, 
agencies were asked to report initiatives they believed would present future opportunities 
for their port area. 
Upon receipt and analysis of the first round of questions, the author sent each 
survey respondent a supplemental questionnaire. This supplemental questionnaire probed 
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areas of interest that had been raised in the previous round of questions, and each survey 
respondent received the same list of four questions. First, respondents were asked about 
the role of law enforcement in the recovery phase of homeland security. Second, 
respondents were asked about their practices enforcing federal regulations related to port 
security. Third, respondents were asked to detail their participation in information-
sharing forums specific to maritime homeland security. Fourth, respondents were asked 
about the role of their respective state governments in the field of maritime homeland 
security.  
Once the first and second rounds of questions were completed, the author 
analyzed the information provided and searched to identify where common best practices 
and challenges were identified. Recognizing that this survey was a relatively small 
sample size, he examined the responses that indicated half or more of the responding 
agencies were believed a practice was a success or a challenge for their port. These 
common responses were further analyzed to identify themes within the context of 
maritime homeland security practices.  
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IV. ROUND ONE SURVEY RESPONSES 
The first survey question and responses were designed to establish basic 
information about the respondents and their agencies. Respondents were asked to identify 
their position and role in their agency, and to provide some information about the size 
and operational responsibilities of their respective agencies. After exploring the 
information about the respondents and each agency, the stage was set by asking open-
ended questions about best practices, lessons learned, future challenges, and future 
opportunities. Some of the areas explored in these questions included inquiries about 
grants, training, certifications, and homeland security efforts within each port.  
A. DOD/DHS/MARAD AGENCIES 
As explained earlier, an emphasis was placed on agencies that were some 
combination of high-risk (DHS criteria), strategic ports (DOD criteria), or top ten 
commercial ports (MARAD criteria). Each agency agreeing to participate in the research 
was evaluated to determine where they fit into each of these criteria. The following 
summarizes the results of this evaluation: 
• Three agencies operated in a port that met all three of the previously 
identified criteria. This port was a DHS Group I port, a DOD strategic 
port, and was also listed in the MARAD top ten commercial ports. 
• Two agencies operated in a DHS Group I and MARAD top ten 
commercial ports.  
• One agency operated in a DOD strategic and DHS Group I port. 
B. RESPONDENT AGENCY GENERAL QUESTION RESPONSES 
Of the agencies surveyed, two agencies were located along the west coast of the 
United States. These two agencies were primary or responding agencies to the port areas 
of Seattle/Tacoma and Los Angeles/Long Beach. Two agencies were located along the 
U.S. southeast coast (near the Gulf of Mexico). These two agencies were primary or 
responding agencies to one of the port areas in Texas and the Port of New Orleans. The 
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other two agencies were located along the U.S. east coast and were primary or responding 
agencies to the ports areas of Virginia and Philadelphia.47  
Agencies were asked to identify if they were a state, local, or other type of 
agency. One agency respondent described the agency as a port authority agency while 
one agency was a special district agency, two agencies were identified as state agencies, 
and two were identified as departments of their respective city agencies.48 As defined by 
the Merriam-Webster online dictionary, a special district is “a political subdivision of a 
state established to provide a single public service (as water supply or sanitation) within a 
specific geographic area.”49 In this case, the specific geographic area was a port within 
the United States. 
Every agency surveyed reported that it shared jurisdictional patrol responsibilities 
with at least one other agency. On average (arithmetic mean), each agency shared 
jurisdiction with two other local agencies, one state agency, and one federal agency.50 
Five of the six responding agencies reported that they had a law enforcement presence 
within their port area 24 hours per day, seven days per week.51 The sixth agency reported 
that it was a secondary responding agency, called in to assist primary responding 
agencies. However, this agency also reported that it would be a state agency leading 
investigations into matters that compromise maritime homeland security, and it could be 
the lead agency in the recovery from a maritime homeland security incident.  
C. AGENCY STAFFING INFORMATION 
The agencies responding to this survey were comprised of state, local, port 
authority and special district law enforcement agencies that serve a primary or supporting 
role in maritime law enforcement and homeland security matters. Respondent agencies 
                                                 
47 All:Q1. 
48 All:Q3. 
49 “Special District,” accessed February 29, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/special 
%20district.  
50 Average determined by adding number of agencies from R1–R6:Q9 responses, dividing sum by 6. 
51 Q8:R1–R4, R6. R5 is not a 24/7 maritime law enforcement agency. 
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ranged in size from less than 50 employees for the three of the agencies,52 about 200 
employees for one agency,53 and two agencies that reported more than 2,000 
employees.54 Two agencies had increased staffing since 9/11, two agencies had 
decreased staffing, and two agencies reported no change in staffing since 9/11.55  
Although two of the agencies reported staffing cuts, all but one of the survey 
respondents reported that its agency had significantly changed and increased its 
operational responsibilities since the terrorist attacks of 9/11.56 The one agency that 
reported no operational changes was a responding or supporting agency, providing 
landside only law enforcement services in the port area. Four of the six agencies 
identified their operational changes as a shift from traditional law enforcement duties, to 
a model focused on securing critical infrastructure within the maritime domain using 
police patrols. Three agencies reported a significant shift in the security posture of their 
ports, and their respective agencies being the lead in increasing physical security 
measures at the facilities of their ports.57 As one respondent wrote, the port they 
represented had shifted from an “open port” before 9/11 to a secured and controlled 
access port.58  
D. AGENCY EXPERTS RESPONDING TO THE SURVEYS 
The survey respondents were comprised of two command staff (police captain or 
higher), two lieutenants, and two line operators (one officer and one senior special 
agent).59 These respondents were identified as the representatives from their agencies as 
satisfying the previously listed criteria: 
                                                 
52 Q4:R1, R3, R4. 
53 Q4:R2. 
54 Q4:R5, R6. 
55 Q6:R1, R2 (increase); R3, R4 (decrease); R5, R6 (no change). 
56 Q10:R1–R4, R6. 




• be employed by a state or local law enforcement agency whose duties 
include providing port security or maritime law enforcement duties 
• fill a position within one of these agencies that has knowledge of 
operations related to port security and maritime law enforcement 
• be able to provide perspective about changes in their agencies’ and their 
ports’ security and law enforcement system since 9/11 
All survey respondents were queried about questions related to the type of 
government agency they represented, staffing and operations, type of law enforcement 
certification their personnel receive, and shared operations and jurisdiction with other 
agencies in their maritime domain.  
E. BEST PRACTICES RESPONSES 
This section of survey questions asked about which federal (Q13) and state (Q16) 
government programs had been most successful for respondent maritime homeland 
security agencies, how each agency has participated in grants (Q14) and how these grants 
have been used (Q15), what training areas have best prepared each agency (Q17), and in 
what phases of the homeland security event cycle each agency has had the most success. 
1. Successful Federal Programs 
While this question did not ask about specific federal programs, respondents 
identified the grant programs60 and interagency partnerships61 implemented in their ports 
as being the most successful practices.  
Four of the five agencies having experience with federal grants responded that it 
had been the most successful federal maritime homeland security program. One agency 
did not participate in any federal port security grants.62 Agencies identified the use of 
these federal grant programs as having provided equipment that better prepared their 
agencies to fulfill their maritime homeland security mission, or security elements that had 
                                                 
60 Q13:R1, R2, R4, and R6. 
61 Q13:R1, R2, and R3. 
62 Q13:R5. 
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been added to facilities and critical infrastructure to meet federal requirements under the 
MTSA.  
Three of the six respondent agencies believed that interagency partnerships that 
highlighted information sharing, exercises and drills, training, or task forces were also 
successful federal maritime homeland security programs. These three agencies were able 
to provide 12 examples of different partnerships that existed in their respective ports to 
improve maritime homeland security. Examples included the Areas Maritime Security 
Committee, three task forces, operations centers, and training partnerships. 
2. Successful State Programs 
No consensus was demonstrated amongst surveyed agencies about successful 
state government maritime homeland security programs. Two agencies identified general 
emergency management, mandated police training, and general terrorism training 
provided by their respective states.63 Based upon these responses or the lack of responses 
about successful state government maritime homeland security training, the author asked 
about the role of the state government in the realm of maritime homeland security.  
3. Success in Grants 
All except for one64 of the surveyed agencies had experience with port security 
related grant programs. As explained in the section related to successful federal grant 
programs, agencies purchased equipment to conduct their maritime homeland security 
mission, and they used grant funds to secure facilities and critical infrastructure to meet 
federal MTSA requirements. Through the responses to these grant related questions, a 
strong consensus indicated that the maritime homeland security mission represented a 
significant change for these agencies. Their existing equipment and critical infrastructure 
security65 was not sufficient to comply with federal requirements, nor was it sufficient to 
                                                 
63 Q16:R2, R4. 
64 Q14:R5 
65 Q15:R1, R2, R3, and R4. 
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satisfy their perceived expanded role as not just police agencies, but agencies tasked with 
securing the maritime domain.66 
4. Success in Training 
The respondents did not show a consensus about what training areas had best 
prepared their agencies. Examples of the best training included courses on the Incident 
Command System,67 terrorism training,68 natural disaster exercises,69 vessel operations, 
and underwater IED courses.70 One respondent also identified its own agency’s on the 
job training as being the most successful training practice.71  
The final best practices question asked about the homeland security cycle 
(identified as prevent, prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover) and what phase of the 
cycle each agency had been most successful in strengthening. The author’s thought was 
that after exploring success in federal and state programs, grants and training, these 
agencies may be able to identify how these successes had best strengthened maritime 
homeland security in their respective areas. 
5. Success in Prevention, Preparedness, Mitigation, Response, and 
Recovery 
While no consensus was indicated in the areas in which these agencies had most 
strengthened their efforts, it was clear that most agencies believed they had strengthened 
their pre-incident (prevention and preparedness) efforts. Two respondents identified 
preparedness and two identified prevention. These agencies identified the target 
hardening or physical security measures (lighting, fencing, barriers, and access control) 
as the reason they had been most successful in these phases.72 
                                                 
66 Q15:R1, R2, R4, and R5. 





72 Q18:R1, R3, R4, and R6. 
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In summary, the author learned from the responses about best practices in 
maritime homeland security that the greatest successes were believed to be in the areas of 
federal grant programs to equip agencies for their expanded mission under homeland 
security and to secure facilities and critical infrastructure within their respective ports. 
Also, no consensus was demonstrated about successful training programs or successful 
state government programs. 
F. LESSONS LEARNED 
The next section of survey questions was labeled “lessons learned” and this area 
of inquiry was intended to elicit responses about areas that these agencies had found most 
challenging. Specifically, the questions asked about what challenges agencies had faced 
in federal and state programs and what phases of the homeland security cycle (prevent, 
prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover) had been the most challenging to develop. 
1. Challenges in Federal Programs 
Respondents were asked about what federal program challenges they had 
encountered in maritime homeland security. Interestingly, just as a consensus of the 
surveyed agencies believed that grants had been the most successful of the federal 
programs, a consensus also shown that the grants programs were the most challenging 
federal government concern. As previously mentioned, five of the six surveyed agencies 
had experience participating in federal port security grants. Therefore, the response by 
three of the agencies or 60% of agencies with grant experience created a consensus.73 
When citing concerns about these challenges, two elements of the grant programs created 
concern. First, two agencies noted that they had experienced a decrease in available grant 
funding.74 Second, one agency reported that the process to obtain grant funds approved 
and received was lengthy and made it difficult to receive funds in a timely manner.75 
                                                 
73 Q19:R1, R3, and R6. 
74 Q19:R1 and R6. 
75 Q19:R3 
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The only other challenge shared by more than one respondent was noted as the 
gap between federal regulations and state or local enforcement of these regulations. Two 
agencies believed it was a concern.76 One agency cited a concern that it fell to state and 
local agencies to enforce these regulations, and these agencies had no authority to do so. 
This lack of authority resulted in applying a state or local ordinance, which may not 
convey the seriousness of the offense committed.77 The second respondent believed that 
a gap existed in training or education between what MTSA and the Transportation 
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) enforcement required, and what state and local 
agencies understood about these regulations.78 
The next survey question asked about challenges with state government maritime 
homeland security programs. As observed in the previous section on best practices, no 
consensus was demonstrated about what state government programs had been successful.  
2. Challenges in State Programs 
As with best practices in state maritime homeland security programs, no 
consensus was exhibited concerning what challenges existed in state programs. Two 
respondents believed that the state government could fill a significant gap in training or 
education of state and local police agencies to satisfy the enforcement of federal 
regulations.79 In the same manner that state governments might have a centralized agency 
to standardize basic police certifications, these agencies believed state government had a 
role in standardizing the basic certification of state and local agencies in the field of 
maritime homeland security.80  
The final question on lessons learned explored what phase (prevent, prepare, 
mitigate, respond, and recover) of the homeland security cycle had been most challenging 
for these agencies to strengthen. 
                                                 
76 Q19:R2 and R4. 
77 Q19:R2. 
78 Q19:R4. 
79 Q20:R1 and R4. 
80 Q20:R4. 
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3. Challenges in the Homeland Security Cycle 
Three of the six respondents believed that recovery presented the greatest 
challenge for their agencies to strengthen.81 All three agencies noting it as the greatest 
cycle challenge provided explanations for their responses. The first respondent observed 
past drills and exercises had been focused primarily on response and mitigation of 
incidents. However, this agency had recently begun devoting “time and resources” to the 
recovery phase to ensure a “safe and sound economic recovery for the Port.”82 
The second respondent reported that the challenge of working with agencies 
outside of law enforcement to ensure recovery from an incident was the factor that made 
this phase of the cycle most challenging.83 
The third agency noting the recovery challenge identified its staffing reductions as 
the greatest cause for this phase of the cycle being a challenge. This respondent believed 
that the demands of dedicating additional staffing to sustain a recovery effort made it a 
great concern not only for his agency, but also for other agencies in the same port area. It 
is worth noting that this agency had experience with recovering from an incident 
impacting its port area.84 
Summarizing the lessons learned for these state and local agencies, grants were 
believed by the respondents to be both very successful and very challenging. The 
challenge was believed to be access to grant funds, either due to decreased funding 
amounts or because of the lengthy process required to gain necessary approvals. No 
consensus was shown about state government program challenges, but perhaps an 
opportunity exists for the state government to fill basic training gap for state and local 
agencies. The recovery phase was believed to be the most challenging of the homeland 
security cycle due to the sustained time, resource, staffing, and interagency cooperation 
commitment required. 
                                                 





G. FUTURE CHALLENGES 
This section of questions asked respondents two questions to explore what 
challenges they believed they would experience in the future, and to identify what they 
believed changes in budget would mean for their agencies.  
1. Challenges on the Horizon 
No consensus was expressed among the surveyed respondents about what 
challenges they might face in the future. The only future challenge shared by more than 
one respondent was the area of grants. Two respondents believed that their greatest future 
challenge would be lack of or decreasing grant funding.85 One of these respondents 
believed the expectation on his agency to fulfill the maritime homeland security mission 
would continue, and the loss of grant funds, coupled with this continued expanded 
mission, would be the greatest future challenge.86 
This sustainment of the maritime homeland security mission into the future was 
also a concern independent of a decrease in grant funds. One agency believed its greatest 
future challenge would be the ability to maintain current staffing levels, and therefore, to 
sustain its maritime homeland security posture.87 The other respondent believed that 
stricter federal regulations would create demands on his staff and patrolling 
responsibilities.88 
Only one agency believed a future challenge would be an attack on its port area. 
Identifying it as a “waterborne attack,”89 it was a departure from the other responses that 
identified disruptions in funding or staffing. 
The second question in this section asked respondents about changes in their 
respective budgets and how these changes impact their operations. 
                                                 






2. Budget Changes 
Three respondents reported that changes in budget would require them to alter 
their maritime homeland security operations.90 These three agencies noted a difference 
between their maritime homeland security operations and their responsibilities as state 
and local law enforcement. One agency noted that it would become more reliant on 
technology to secure facilities and critical infrastructure to make its personnel available 
for law enforcement operations.91 Two other respondents reported that they would focus 
on priority services and allow other capabilities to wane.92 
Summarizing what the author learned from the future challenges section of this 
survey, grant funding and staffing concerns were believed to be the greatest future 
challenges for these agencies. For both grants and staffing, the concern about the future 
was that these agencies might not be able to sustain their required maritime homeland 
security mission obligations due to changes in their own budgets, or because of the loss 
or decrease of available grants. 
H. FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES 
The final section of the initial round of survey questions asked two questions. 
First, in general, what opportunities were there to better prepare these agencies for the 
future? Second, how could federal programs or practices be changed to better equip or 
prepare these agencies? 
1. General Opportunities 
Five of the six respondents identified training as the area of greatest future 
opportunities.93 While these five respondents identified their training opportunities 
differently, all respondents believed training was the key to best preparing their 
respective agencies for the future. Basic, standardized port security awareness and 
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preparedness training was believed to be the best opportunity for three of the agencies. 
The remaining two agencies identified general training opportunities as the key to best 
prepare their agencies. 
The second future opportunities question asked about ways to improve federal 
programs or practices to prepare or equip state and local law enforcement agencies better.  
2. Changes in Federal Programs or Practices 
Four respondents believed changes to federal grant programs could be made that 
would provide the most benefit for state and local law enforcement.94 First, federal grants 
could be improved by providing incentives for emergency preparedness and mutual aid 
partnerships.95 Second, grant programs could be more flexible to allow for more funding 
to be applied to personnel and training costs.96 Third, by shifting grant focus away from 
facility and critical infrastructure security and to improving preparedness of the state and 
local law enforcement personnel patrolling port areas, these funds would better prepare 
these agencies for maritime homeland security incidents.97 Finally, one respondent 
identified increasing the amount of available funding as the best way to change federal 
programs.98 
No consensus was shown about other ways to improve federal programs or 
practices. Other issues discussed included information sharing and mutual aid. 
To summarize the identified future opportunities, state and local law enforcement 
believed that the best way to prepare and equip their agencies for the future was to offer 
improved training opportunities for these agencies. Changes to flexibility within the grant 
programs, increased funding, and incentives for partnerships was believed to be the best 
way to improve federal programs and practices. 
                                                 






V. SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS 
After completing this initial round of survey questions, the author reviewed the 
responses provided and developed a second round of supplemental questions to explore 
four areas of inquiry. First, respondents were asked about the role of law enforcement in 
the recovery phase of the homeland security cycle. Since it was identified by consensus 
as the most challenging phase of the cycle for law enforcement agencies, the author 
developed a question to ask about what these agencies believed was their role and ideally 
to better understand why this phase presented a challenge. Second, he asked about the 
practice of state and local agencies enforcing federal regulations. Both from his own 
experience in maritime homeland security and based upon the survey responses received, 
he knows it is an area of concern, with a need for coordination, and is an area in which 
opportunities may exist. This area of concern was mentioned 12 times in the initial 
survey questions.  
The third supplemental question asked about information-sharing groups, 
committees, or centers that specifically focused on maritime homeland security matters. 
Surveyed respondents referred to these forums 11 times in the initial round of survey 
questions, and it was important to identify specific examples that focused on port security 
matters. Fourth, the author asked about the state government role in providing training or 
certifications for maritime homeland security matters. Training needs were identified 14 
times in the previous round of survey questions, and it seemed that a perceived void 
existed in the involvement of state government in standardizing training in maritime 
homeland security.  
A. ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN RECOVERY 
Since half of the agencies had identified this phase of the homeland security cycle 
as being the most challenging phase,99 the author wanted to understand what these 
agencies believed their role was in recovery and hopefully to better understand why it 
presented a challenge. 
                                                 
99 Q21:R1, R2, and R4. 
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All six of the respondents identified that the staffing required from their agencies 
to ensure the security of the port in the aftermath of an incident was the factor that made 
recovery the most challenging.100 This demand on personnel, coupled with the perception 
that recovery from these incidents was a long-term commitment, were two of the factors 
identified.  
One respondent101 was able to provide a detailed explanation of the role of his 
agency to support recovery from an incident. Like the other five respondents, this 
respondent discussed the need to provide additional personnel to promote security within 
the port. However, this respondent was able to identify a specific plan within the port that 
identified his agency’s responsibilities during recovery. Generally, this agency was 
responsible for shore side and waterside security, patrols, and traffic control.  
From this general description of responsibilities, this respondent discussed how 
these duties are integral to “assist in keeping the Port open and commerce moving.”102 
To that end, his agency had agreements to partner with other departments within the port 
and allied agencies to assist with damage assessment, debris removal, repairs, and other 
duties to “get the port back to normal operations.”103 These efforts included the shifting 
of equipment typically used for security missions, and repurposing this equipment and 
personnel to assist with assessments of prioritized infrastructure. 
Summarizing the responses to the first supplemental question, state and local law 
enforcement agencies believe the demands on their staffing over a long duration of time 
are factors that make the recovery phase the most challenging. In addition to merely 
dedicating additional personnel to recovery efforts, one respondent was able to provide a 
detailed plan and objectives to be accomplished by his agency while recovering from a 
maritime homeland security incident. 
                                                 





B. STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
With the changes implemented by the MTSA, and the additional federal 
regulations this act put into place, the author asked agencies to identify their practices 
regarding the enforcement of these federal regulations. Since five of the six agencies 
surveyed were responsible for 24/7/365 operations within their respective ports,104 it 
seemed likely that these agencies would at least be a “first responder” to federal 
regulation violations, and at most, could be a “first enforcer” of these regulations.  
Four of the respondents reported that their respective agencies were authorized to 
enforce federal regulations.105 This enforcement was done directly by two agencies,106 
through task force officers by one agency,107 and by written agreement by one agency.108 
One of the challenges noted by an agency that directly enforces these violations was the 
difficulty in getting federal prosecutors to accept and file the case. The fallback position 
for this agency was to enforce a less specific state or local ordinance (criminal trespass or 
fictitious government document), which may not convey the same seriousness as the 
prevailing federal statute.109 
The responses to this supplemental question revealed no consensus regarding how 
state and local law enforcement agencies. These agencies either relied on state and local 
ordinances to enforce federal violations, federal regulations directly, or these regulations 
under the authority of a federal task force. 
C. MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY FOCUSED INFORMATION 
SHARING 
Every surveyed agency was able to provide at least one example of a group of 
federal, state, and local agency representatives who met to share information on maritime 
homeland security. The common thread throughout these information-sharing forums was 
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the Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) led by the USCG.110 Not only was the 
main committee identified by the respondents as a mechanism for sharing information, 
but four of the respondents were able to identify sub-committees under the AMSC that 
met to ensure information sharing within smaller groups to facilitate event or team 
specific sharing of information. Examples included the intelligence, law enforcement, 
and dive operations sub-committees.111 
The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF),112 the Terrorism Early Warning 
(TEW)113 group, and area fusion centers were also listed in the layers of information 
sharing about maritime homeland security. 
The layered examples of information sharing provided by the respondents 
indicated a two-way flow of information. First, for groups centered within ports, these 
groups actively engaged in information sharing with entities outside the port for 
situational awareness (from the AMSC to the JTTF, TEW or fusion centers).114 Second, 
entities centered outside of the port (JTTF, TEW, fusion centers) had embedded port 
representatives or squads to ensure a maritime homeland security context in information 
and intelligence sharing (from these groups to the port areas).115 
D. STATE TRAINING AND CERTIFICATIONS 
Respondents were asked about the role of the state government in providing 
training or certification specifically for maritime homeland security matters. Five of six 
of the respondents believed the state governments had a role to play in standardizing 
training for their respective agencies.116 Following the state system of certifying basic 
police training, four of the agencies believed state government should certify training 
                                                 
110 SQ3:R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and R6. 
111 Ibid. 
112 SQ3:R2, and R3. 
113 SQ3:R1. 
114 SQ3:R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and R6. 
115 SQ3:R1, R2, R3, and R4.  
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standards for maritime homeland security.117 While not going so far as to say that the 
state government should provide standards or certification for maritime homeland 
security, one respondent believed the role of the state government was to provide funding 
for maritime homeland security training.118 One respondent believed maritime homeland 
security certifications and training were the responsibility of the federal government.119 
Summarizing the responses from the fourth supplemental question, five of the six 
surveyed agencies believed the state government had a role to play in maritime homeland 
security training or certification. Four of these agencies believed that the role included 
standardizing training to be provided for state and local law enforcement, and one agency 
believed the state government should provide funding for the necessary training. 
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VI. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
The maritime domain is vast and its security poses significant challenges for 
agencies public and private, federal, state, local and tribal, police, fire, and other 
disciplines. Protecting and securing this domain, however, ensures the flow of commerce, 
provides a system for military movement of equipment and personnel, and supports an 
environment protected for many other uses.  
A. MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY AS A NEW MISSION 
The maritime homeland security agencies responding to this survey all reported a 
consensus that they had altered their primary mission from a focus primarily on crime 
prevention and law enforcement to a mission that leans toward creating a safe and secure 
environment within their ports. At the same time, these agencies did not leave behind 
their traditional police agency responsibilities.120 Rather, they added additional 
operational duties including suspicious activity reporting and investigation, anti-terrorism 
operations, joint agency task forces, tactical and special units, and security zone 
enforcement.121 Such a change in mission focus has come at a significant cost in staffing 
and resources from these agencies.  
Considering that 2/3 of surveyed agencies reported a reduction or no change in 
their budgeted staffing, adding the maritime homeland security mission focus has led to 
these agencies having a perception that they are doing more with less. Filling the budget 
gap between law enforcement, crime prevention mission, and the expanded focus to 
include a maritime homeland security mission, federal grant programs have provided 
equipment, training, and security apparatus for critical infrastructure. These grants and 
products they have provided serve as a much-needed mechanism for support of the 
expanded mission focus under the maritime homeland security. While these grants have 
well served maritime homeland security agencies for the purchase of target hardening 
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security elements (cameras, lighting, fencing, and barriers), they have not served as a 
good conduit for the personnel and training needs of these agencies.122  
It is also apparent, based on the survey responses that agencies have relied heavily 
on partnerships with other federal, state, and local agencies to ensure the ability to secure 
America’s ports under the maritime homeland security mission. The majority of agencies 
saw their greatest future challenge as anything that might disrupt the system of maritime 
homeland security that has emerged from these partnerships. Whether it was loss of grant 
funding or reductions in budgeted funds and staffing, these disruptions were the greatest 
concern for surveyed agencies.123 
B. GRANT FUNDING 
This research revealed a unanimous opinion among the respondent experts that 
federal grants had provided equipment, training, technology, and other security measures. 
These elements of port security put into place through federal grants had allowed these 
agencies to expand from merely being police agencies, to becoming agencies that 
addressed larger maritime homeland security issues. Some of the examples were the 
ability to implement measures to secure the facilities and critical infrastructure physically 
within ports. Cameras, access control, fencing, lighting, and barriers served as some of 
the security elements put into place to convert ports from “open” pre-9/11 to “secure” in 
a post-9/11 environment. Outside of facility and critical infrastructure elements, these 
agencies also were able to provide equipment, training, and facilities to support their 
expanded operational responsibilities.124  
Two general areas of concern arose through these survey responses that relate to 
the federal grant programs. First, agencies were concerned about decreases in grant 
funding, and it was apparent that the agencies participating in federal grant programs had 
become dependent upon them to put into place and keep in place the security mechanism 
for their ports’ security.  
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Fears that these grant programs are beginning or continuing to be reduced may 
lead these state and local maritime law enforcement agencies to revert to their pre-9/11 
posture and missions. In the case of the federal PSGP, funding allocations to this program 
since 2008 supports fears of reduced funding. In 2008, this program (PSGP) was 
allocated $388,600,000, and since then, funding has dwindled to $100,000,000 allocated 
in 2014.125 It was clear from the survey responses received that 1/3 of the agencies 
considered the reduction in grant funding, coupled with reductions in budgeted staff, to 
be a threat to their ability to continue to satisfy the maritime homeland security mission. 
For these agencies, they reported they would revert to a focus on more traditional, pre-9/
11 law enforcement focused operations. Such operations shift from the securing and 
patrolling of marine facilities, and return law enforcement to a focus on law enforcement 
and crime prevention. It is important to note that to the extent maritime law enforcement 
agencies are dependent upon grant funding to sustain their maritime homeland security 
mission operations, reduced funding could reduce these types of missions and shift 
agencies to a pre-9/11 focus on crime prevention and law enforcement operations.  
The second general concern was that federal grants did not necessarily provide 
funding in areas most needed by state and local law enforcement. Specifically, these 
agencies believed that funding should be available for use to cover personnel and training 
costs associated with the maritime homeland security mission.126 
C. UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
RECOVERY 
It is imperative after acknowledging the “new mission” of maritime homeland 
security for state and local law enforcement that these agencies understand their 
respective roles in the homeland security cycle; from preparing and preventing incidents 
where possible, to mitigating and responding, through to the post-disaster recovery role 
for law enforcement. The agencies surveyed in this research clearly believed that they 
had been very successful in developing pre-incident (prevention and preparedness) 
                                                 
125 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) FY 2014 
Port Security Grant Program (PSGP). 
126 Q22:R2, R4; Q23:R4; Q24:R1, R2, R3, R5, R6; Q25:R2, and R4. 
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capabilities. These agencies identified their efforts to install physical security measures as 
the key to success in strengthening these phases of the cycle.127  
As experienced through terrorist acts of 9/11 and the Oklahoma City bombing, as 
well as natural disasters, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, the recovery phase is an 
enduring one for regions experiencing these incidents. It is imperative for law 
enforcement to understand its role in the recovery phase of the homeland security cycle. 
Half of the agencies identified this phase of the cycle as the most challenging to 
develop.128 The reasons recovery posed a significant challenge for these agencies were 
the heavy and sustained staffing demands the respondents believed this phase would 
place on their agencies. For example, in the event a natural disaster or human generated 
attack disabled the physical security elements in a port’s critical infrastructure protection, 
state and local law enforcement personnel would be required to secure these areas until 
the facility security measures were repaired.129 
Yet, previous research, as mentioned in the literature review of this thesis, has 
yielded little information on promising practices as it pertains to recovery efforts in the 
maritime environment.130 Beyond the demands of sustained staffing to fill security gaps 
for recovery efforts, two agencies offered insight into what their respective ports were 
doing to strengthen their recovery posture in the aftermath of an incident. One agency 
reported that recovery was missing from past drills and exercises conducted within its 
port. Due to this factor, no common understanding was reached about the demands 
recovery might place on regional agencies responding to an incident in the port.131 Thus, 
a starting point for the role of state and local law enforcement in recovery efforts might 
be an intentional, planned discussion as part of an existing exercise to identify what 
initial demands might be placed on state and local agencies following an incident.  
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Another respondent outlined its recovery efforts and was able to identify an 
existing plan that covered resource and staffing expectations that would be placed upon 
its agency. It included a plan to team up with existing departments to shift security 
equipment and personnel to support a return to normal operations. Steps outlined under 
this plan were coordinated under the leadership of the USCG COTP.132 This plan as part 
of a coordinated effort to recover from an incident appears to be a good practice for 
stepping beyond exercise discussions, and placing detailed and coordinated expectations 
upon state and local law enforcement.  
D. TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION FOR THE NEW MISSION OF 
MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY 
Given the shift in mission acknowledged by state and local law enforcement 
agencies surveyed, training and certification standards for law enforcement are critical to 
success in maritime homeland security. Ports and the maritime domain are vast expanses 
of public and private facilities that cover multiple jurisdictions, diverse transportation 
nodes, and infrastructure critical to commerce and the movement of military equipment 
and personnel. Adding complexity to this domain are regulations and requirements put 
into place by various federal agencies, yet requiring enforcement from the state and local 
agencies patrolling the U.S. ports. Indeed, five of the six surveyed agency respondents 
believed great opportunity existed for future training to fill significant gaps in state and 
local agency maritime homeland security responsibilities.133 This response was the 
strongest consensus result from the survey, other than grant related responses. 
When asked to identify the gaps that existed for these agencies and what might be 
done to fill these gaps, two themes emerge. First, half of the surveyed respondents 
believed standardized training was needed to assist their agency personnel with 
understanding and enforcing federal port security regulations. TWIC, security 
requirements outlined in the MTSA, and enforcement of federal security and restricted 
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areas were three examples of these federal regulatory requirements.134 In the absence of 
standardized training, these agencies had filled this gap through on the job, “in house” 
training. 
Every respondent to this survey reported that their agency personnel received 
state mandated, standardized certification to become basic police officers.135 This method 
of providing standardized training through a state certifying body appears to be a good 
opportunity for providing standardized maritime homeland security training as well. 
Given the shift in mission acknowledged by state and local law enforcement 
agencies surveyed, training and certification standards for law enforcement are critical to 
success in maritime homeland security. Ports and the maritime domain are vast expanses 
of public and private facilities that cover multiple jurisdictions, diverse transportation 
nodes and infrastructure critical to commerce, and the movement of military equipment 
and personnel. Adding complexity to this domain are regulations and requirements, 
implemented by various federal agencies, yet requiring enforcement from the state and 
local agencies patrolling the U.S. ports. The agencies surveyed in this thesis reported 
several approaches to enforcing federal maritime regulations.  
However, one example of an effort to standardize training for police officers in 
the maritime domain did present itself. Beginning in 2009, Los Angeles area local police 
and sheriff’s agencies partnered with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC) to develop a basic maritime operator’s course. This course was developed by 
the Maritime Law Enforcement Training Center (MLETC) in the Port of Los Angeles, 
California to standardize the training police officers utilize in their maritime homeland 
security operations. Rather than the State of California mandating requirements for these 
police officers, courses valuable to the police officers have been developed at the local 
level and state certification has been granted for these courses. The goal of MLETC is to 
provide a mechanism whereby state and local law enforcement develop a standardized 
approach to their roles in maritime law enforcement and homeland security. Recognizing 
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these agencies are required to do both policing and port security on the water, the training 
offered by MLETC serves as an avenue to standardize training for agencies within the 
State of California.136 
Opportunities may also result as they relate to how agencies within the United 
States have taken their practices and worked with international ports to improve maritime 
domain security throughout the world. As America’s ports are only one component of the 
global network of ports, it stands to reason that securing ports that export to America is 
by extension not only securing the ports of origin, but also securing the American ports 
receiving their shipments.  
In 2015, the San Diego Unified Port District’s Harbor Police Department (San 
Diego Harbor Police) signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the U.S. 
Department of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), 
designed to enhance maritime security assistance to ports in Asia and Latin America. 
Under this partnership agreement, the San Diego Harbor Police will seek to host visitors 
from foreign ports, as well as to visit foreign ports, in the hope of offering insights and 
practices to secure better ports shipping goods to the Port of San Diego.137 While this 
program is a recent port security effort, the Port of Miami has also signed on to a similar 
MOU to enhance maritime security efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. As these 
MOUs and partnerships develop, opportunities may arise to study and document the 
successes within these port areas.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Just as America’s system of ports is widespread, diverse, and comprised of 
components of commerce, recreation, national defense, and tourism, so too must be the 
approach to maritime homeland security. This research examined only the role of state 
and local law enforcement as it relates to their practices securing the maritime domain.  
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The field of maritime homeland security would benefit from additional research 
about successful practices outside of government agencies. Private sector companies play 
an important role in the business of ports, and their security practices should be 
evaluated. This role is especially true in situations in which these practices promote 
collaboration across public private partnerships. 
An additional avenue of research is the enduring role of recovery in the field of 
maritime homeland security, and what role law enforcement should play in this phase of 
the homeland security cycle. If the expectation on law enforcement is to do more than 
merely provide additional staffing to secure maritime facilities, these expectations and 
best practices for recovery should be researched and identified. 
What is clear from this research is that opportunities certainly exist to improve 
aspects of the maritime homeland security system utilized by state and local law 
enforcement. However, strong evidence also states that the most successful practices for 
state and local law enforcement are all tied to partnerships with other state and local 
agencies, as well as federal partners. Task forces, security committees, operations and 
coordination centers, training centers, grant programs, and other partnerships all highlight 
the need for cooperation to secure America’s ports. 
 61 
APPENDIX A 
General Questions (Q1–Q25) 
1. What is the name of your law enforcement agency? 
2. What is your position within your agency? 
3. Is your law enforcement agency best described as a state, county, city, or 
other municipality? 
4. How many full-time, sworn law enforcement personnel is your agency 
budgeted for? 
5. How many civilian/support personnel is your agency budgeted for? 
6. How has your budgeted staffing changed since September 11, 2001? 
7. How have your operational responsibilities changed since the September 
11, 2001? 
8. Does your agency deploy law enforcement personnel 24 hours per day, 7 
days per week for port security and law enforcement purposes?  
9. In your port area, which other agencies (federal/state/local) have personnel 
and vessels on-duty 24/7/365? 
10. What examples can you provide of joint maritime homeland security 
operations between federal/state/local agencies? 
11. Are there separate state standards or certifications required to be a state/
local law enforcement officer in your port area? 
12. Please describe any “special units” your agency utilizes in the realm of 
maritime homeland security. Examples might include dive teams, canine 
units, explosive ordinance disposal, SWAT or Tactical Teams, firefighting 
elements, or other special teams. 
Best Practices 
13. In the realm of maritime homeland security, what federal programs or 
practices have been most successful for your agency? 
14. How has your agency participated in grant programs? 
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15. Have you used grant funds to expand or maintain maritime homeland 
security operations? If you have both expanded and maintained your 
operations, what percentage 
16. In the realm of maritime homeland security, what state programs or 
practices have been most successful for your agency? 
17. What training areas have best prepared your agency to secure the port 
areas you police? 
18. What phases of the homeland security event cycle (prevent, prepare, 
mitigate, respond, recover) have you had the most success in strengthening 
at your agency? 
Lessons Learned 
19. What challenges has your agency encountered with federal programs or 
practices in maritime homeland security? 
20. What challenges has your agency encountered with state programs or 
practices in maritime homeland security? 
21. What phases of the homeland security event cycle (prevent, prepare, 
mitigate, respond, recover) have you found to be the most challenging to 
strengthen at your agency? 
Future Challenges  
22. What challenges might be on the horizon that you believe your agency 
will face in the realm of maritime homeland security? 
23. How have changes in budget affected your agency? How have these 
changed your agency’s operations? 
Future Opportunities 
24. What opportunities for your agency are you planning on to better prepare 
or equip your agency for the future? 
25. Where can federal programs or practices be changed to better prepare or 




Maritime Homeland Security Survey Supplemental Questions (SQ1–SQ4) 
1. What is the role of law enforcement in the recovery phase of maritime 
homeland security incidents?  
2. Are there examples of agreements, or state laws that allow your agency to 
enforce federal regulations (examples might be security/restricted zone 
enforcement or TWIC regulations)?  
3. Are there examples (groups, centers, committees) of information sharing 
specifically focused on maritime homeland security matters?  
4. What is the role of state agencies in providing training or certifications 
specifically for maritime homeland security matters?  
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